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Municipal Employee Residency Requirements
and Equal Protection
Municipal employees' in many American cities must reside2 in the
city or county as a condition of employment. The residency restric-
tions are sometimes imposed by state statute,3 but more often by
municipal charter,4 ordinance5 or administrative regulation.
1. This Note will not consider the related "officer" residency laws. An officer is one
who shares in the vital policymaking or decisionmaking of a governmental unit and
exercises some portion of its sovereign powers. For the distinction between municipal
"officer" and "employee," see E. MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
§ 12.30 (rev. 3d ed. 1973). Certain classes of personnel--teachers, policemen, firemen and
clerical workers-clearly are not officers. It may be difficult to determine the appropriate
category for some municipal workers. The residency litigation discussed in this Note
involves only parties who clearly are municipal employees.
Virtually every state and city requires local officers, elective and appointive, to reside
within the governmental unit which they serve. The restrictions may be imposed by
state constitution or statute (see, e.g., ARK. CONST. art. 19, § 4; N.Y. PUB. OFFICERS LAW
art. 2, § 3 (McKinney Supp. 1973)) or by city charter provision or ordinance (see, e.g.,
Boston, Mass., Ordinances of 1973, ch. 7, § IA, Oct. 16, 1973). Even cities without mu-
nicipal employee residency requirements usually bar officers from maintaining a domicile
outside their boundaries. Municipal entities with employee residency laws often apply
the same ordinance to their officers. See, e.g., CnicAco, ILL., CODE §§ 25-30 (1939).
The major difference between officer and employee residency requirements is that
officers serve a political function, as representatives of the people who selected them
directly by election or indirectly by appointment. This may constitute a compelling
reason for demanding officer residence-"to preserve the basic conception of a political
community...." Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 344 (1972) (holding that bona fide
residence may be required as a condition of political participation as a voter).
2. As used in this Note, the term "residence" is to be equated with domicile (pri-
mary place of residence). Municipal employees often have sought to evade residency
requirements by maintaining a nominal residence inside the required boundaries and
a primary residence outside. The courts have uniformly rejected such maneuvers, con-
struing the term "residence" in ordinances or statutes as meaning "domicile." See, e.g.,
Mercadante v. City of Paterson, 111 N.J. Super. 35, 266 A.2d 611 (Ch. 1970). The resi-
dency ordinances of many cities expressly define residence in terms of domicile. Detroit,
Mich., Ordinance No. 327-G, § 2-1-1.2, June 6, 1968, states: "Residence shall be con-
strued to be the actual domicile of the individual where he normally eats and sleeps
and maintains his normal personal and household effects." See also Los Angeles, Cal.,
Ordinance No. 143,025, Jan. 20, 1972; MILWAUKEE, WIS., CHARTER § 5.02(2) (1971).
3. See IND. CODE § 19-1-2-1 (1971); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 48, § 58E (1972), ch.
41, § 99B (1971). Occasionally state law may exempt employees such as police, firemen,
sanitationmen, and teachers from local residency requirements. See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. OF-
FiCERS LAW art. 2, § 3 (McKinney Supp. 1973).
4. See, e.g., CINCINNATI, OHIO, CODE art XVII, § 1 (1967); NEWARK, N.J., CODE § 2.14-1
(1959).
5. See, e.g., Detroit, Mich., Ordinance No. 327-G, June 6, 1968; Los Angeles, Cal.,
Ordinance No. 143,025, Jan. 20, 1972; San Jose, Cal., Ordinance No. 16043, Jan. 17, 1972.
6. See, e.g., Nashville, Tenn., Civ. Serv. Comm'n Rules ch. 5, § 1, July 1, 1972;
Phoenix, Ariz., Admin. Reg. 2.81, §§ 1-4, Sept. 28, 1972.
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Public workers long have challenged such residency laws. 7 Their
most effective attacks have been in the political arena. Some major
cities have revoked residency requirements," and attempts to impose
them elsewhere occasionally have been unsuccessful. 9 At the same
time, several major cities have imposed new residency restrictions, 10
and others, including New York City, may do so in the near future.-'
7. Among the oldest municipal employee residency cases are Johnson v. State, 132
Ala. 43, 31 So. 493 (1901) (interpreting an "officer" residency requirement) and Hellyer
v. Prendergast, 176 App. Div. 383, 162 N.Y.S. 788 (1917). These and other early cases,
however, involved issues of statutory construction, not of constitutional validity. Almost
uniformly the state courts construed the residency ordinances or statutes against the
plaintiff public employees.
8. Voters in Oakland, Cal., secured repeal of a civil service board rule requiring
residence of all applicants for city jobs (Oakland, Cal., Civ. Serv. Bd. Rule 4, § 4.03
(1971)), in a public referendum on Nov. 5, 1974. Interview with James M. Newman,
Personnel Director, City of Oakland, June 5, 1975 (telephone). In July, 1974, Tampa
removed its city code provision requiring residence within city limits or within an
unincorporated area of the county (TAMPA, FLA., CODE art. I, § 2-2 (1961)). Letter from
Jocelyn W. Elkes, Deputy Personnel Director, City of Tampa, Sept. 9, 1974. (All letters
in this Note were written to Glenn M. Reiter and are on file with the Yale Law Journal.)
Omaha and Norfolk likewise eliminated city residency requirements. Omaha, Neb., Ordi-
nance No. 26992, Nov. 6, 1973; Ordinance to Repeal §§ 2-22.1 to -22.4 of the Code of the
City of Norfolk, Virginia, 1958, Relating to Residency Requirements for Certain Officers
and Employees of the City, June 30, 1972. Jacksonville, Long Beach and Cleveland con-
stitute other major cities which no longer insist upon residence. Jacksonville, Fla., Civ.
Serv. Bd. Bull. No. 2-172, Jan. 17, 1972; letter from City Clerk, City of Long Beach, Cal.,
Aug. 1, 1974; letter from Mercedes Cotner, City Clerk, City of Cleveland, June 24, 1974.
9. Three bills concerning municipal employee residency were introduced in 1972 in
the Baltimore City Council but failed to pass. Letter from C. 0. Strickler, Librarian,
Dep't of Legislative Reference, City of Baltimore, Md., June 25, 1974. One of these bills
was especially novel: it provided for a salary decrease of 10 percent, or a reduction in
job grade, for any resident city employee who removed his residence from the city.
Bill Nos. 397, 398, 399, City Council of Baltimore, Md., June 12, 1972. The Georgia
state legislature rejected a bill in 1973 requiring Atlanta policemen to live within the
city. Letter from Jessy C. Bearden, Deputy Clerk of Council, City of Atlanta, June 24,
1974.
10. Los Angeles added a city residency requirement to its administrative code in
1972, and New Orleans established a county residency rule in 1973. Los Angeles, Cal.,
Ordinance No. 143,025, Jan. 20, 1972; New Orleans, La., Ordinance No. 5240, Aug. 27,
1973. Other major cities, including Birmingham, San Antonio, San Francisco, San Jose
and Toledo, have reenacted their residency requirements with minor amendments.
Birmingham, Ala., Ordinance No. 68-32, June 15, 1968; San Antonio, Tex., Ordinance
35,501, June 8, 1967; San Francisco, Cal., Ordinance No. 204-71, Aug. 6, 1971, as amended,
No. 290-71, Nov. 23, 1971; San Jose, Cal., Ordinance No. 16043, Jan. 17, 1972; ToLEno,
OHIO, CHARTER ch. V, § 61 (1972).
11. New York City soon may reinstate a city residency requirement for its employees
after a hiatus of 13 years. In 1937 the municipal assembly (now city council) enacted
a residency law requiring city domicile, known as the Lyons Law. N.Y. Times, July 14,
1937, at 1, col. 3. This was repealed in 1962 after intense lobbying by civil service em-
ployee unions. N.Y. Times, Mar. 8, 1962, at 25, col. 5. In 1974, bills to require residence
of all New York City employees were introduced before the New York State legislature.
N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1974, at 37, col. 7. Assembly Bill No. 10481, Feb. 20, 1974.
Although the legislature rejected these bills in May, 1975, the New York City Council
sent a "home rule" message to the legislature, requesting the imposition of a residency
requirement. N.Y. Times, May 30, 1975, at 35, col. 3. Subsequently, the state assembly
passed a bill which would require future city employees to live within the city and
bar workers now living there from moving outside city limits. N.Y. Times, June 17, 1975,
at 20, col. 1. The state senate is expected to act on the residency bill soon, and New
York City may rejoin the ranks of major cities with residency requirements for em-
ployees. 42,000 of more than 300,000 New York City workers live outside the city. N.Y.
Times, Feb. 22, 1974, at 37, col. 7.
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When political challenges fail, public employees frequently have
turned to the courts to secure the discretion to live where they choose.
Most courts have sustained the constitutionality of municipal employee
residency requirements,' 2 but some have struck them down.' 3 The
Supreme Court has yet to address the issue.14
This Note enters the debate'3 on the constitutional issues raised
by municipal employee residency requirements. Part I presents a sur-
vey of residency requirements of the 50 largest American cities. Part
II proposes the "substantial relation" test as an appropriate equal pro-
tection formula for review of residency statutes, ordinances and regu-
lations. Part III applies the test, concluding that residency laws often
do not significantly further the purposes attributed to them, and thus
may be unconstitutional as a violation of equal protection. Part IV
suggests that the invalidation of citizenship requirements for munici-
pal employment in Sugarman v. Dougall16 provides a useful analogy
for framing the "substantial relation" challenge to residency require-
ments.
I. A Survey of Residency Requirements
Twenty-one of the 50 largest American cities have no statutory
residency requirements for employment as a municipal worker.'7 The
12. The residency requirements of these major cities have been upheld: Chicago-
Ahern v. Murphy, 457 F.2d 363 (7th Cir. 1972); Detroit-Detroit Police Officers Ass'n
v. City of Detroit, 385 Mich. 519, 190 N.W.2d 97 (1971), appeal dismissed, 405 U.S. 950
(1972); Williams v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 383 Mich. 507, 176 N.W.2d 593 (1970); and
Newark-Abrahams v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 65 N.J. 61, 319 A.2d 483 (1974); Kennedy v.
City of Newark, 29 N.J. 178, 148 A.2d 473 (1959). Berg v. City of Minneapolis, 274 Minn.
277, 143 N.W.2d 200 (1966), sustained a civil service commission residency regulation im-
posed by the defendant city; the political sequel was the enactment of a regulation ex-
pressly authorizing residence outside city limits. Minneapolis, Minn., Civ. Serv. Comm'n
Rule 4.05 (1967).
13. See, e.g., Hanson v. Unified School Dist., 364 F. Supp. 330 (D. Kan. 1973); Don-
nelly v. City of Manchester, 111 N.H. 50, 274 A.2d 789 (1971).
14. The Supreme Court twice has refused to consider challenges to municipal resi-
dency requirements. Ector v. City of Torrance, 10 Cal. 3d 129, 514 P.2d 433, 109 Cal.
Rptr. 849 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 935 (1974); Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. City
of Detroit, 385 Mich. 519, 190 N.W. 97 (1971), appeal dismissed, 405 U.S. 950 (1972).
15. Relatively little has been written about municipal employee residency require-
ments. See Comment, The Constitutionality of Residency Requirements for Municipal
Employees, 24 EMORY L.J. 447 (1975); Note, Municipal Police Residency Restriction: Rem-
nant of Feudalism or Sound Public Policy?, 18 ST. Louis U.L.J. 214 (1973); Note. Residency
Requirements for Municipal Employees: Denial of a Right to Commute?, 7 U.S.F.L. REy.
508 (1973); Note, City Employment Residency Requirements, 7 URn. L. ANN. 414 (1974);
Note, Constitutional Law-Residency Restrictions Upon Teachers' Right of Travel, 8
LAiD & WATER L. REV. 329 (1973).
16. 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
17. For a ranking of the 50 largest American. cities by population, see U.S. DEP'T oF
COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABsTRAcT OF THE U.S. 23-25 (1974). These major cities will be
used as a sample for a survey of municipal residency re" irements. The survey was
conducted by mail in summer, 1974, and has been updated" ince then where indicated.
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other major cities impose varying types of residency requirements.
The most prevalent, adopted by 14 cities, demands that all municipal
employees be bona fide residents living within the boundaries of the
city for the duration of their employment.' 8 Seven cities require
municipal employees to reside within the county in which the city
is situated. 19 Another city has a somewhat larger residence zone; its
workers may live in the county in which the city is located or in any
of the bordering counties. 20 A fourth type of residency requirement
The following cities have no residency requirements (unless otherwise indicated, con-
firmation provided by letters from city officials named below):
Atlanta-Jessy C. Bearden, Deputy Clerk of Council, June 24, 1974; Baltimore-C. 0.
Strickler, Librarian, Dep't of Legislative Reference, June 25, 1974; Cleveland-Mercedes
Cotner, City Clerk, June 25, 1974; Dallas-W. Lee Armstrong, Ass't City Secretary, July
3, 1974; Denver-Terri McClellan, City Clerk's Office, July 5, 1974; Fort Worth-Office
of City Secretary-Treasurer, Aug. 1, 1974; Honolulu-Andrew Muratan, Dep't of Civ.
Serv., Aug. 20, 1974; Houston-Joe Weikerth, Civ. Serv. Dep't, July 15, 1974; Jacksonville
-N.R. Sharpless, Jr., Personnel Manager, Sept. 3, 1974; Long Beach, Cal.-City Clerk,
Aug. 1, 1974; Minneapolis-Minneapolis, Minn., Civ. Serv. Comm'n Rule 4.05 (1967):
"Employees of the city may reside outside . . . the city, except . . . where the Com-
mission determines the best interests of the city are served by requiring [certain] employ-
ees ... to be residents of the city" (letter from John W. Proctor, Ass't Personnel Director,
July 8, 1974, does not indicate that the commission presently requires residence of any
classes of employees); New York-Judith Grad, Opinions and Legislative Division, Law
Dep't, Aug. 2, 1974; see also N.Y. PUB. OFFICERS LAW art. 2, § 3 (McKinney Supp. 1973);
N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1974, at 37, col. 7; Norfolk-Louis S. Hudgins, City Clerk, July 9,
1974; Oakland, Cal.-interview with James M. Newman, Personnel Director, June 5,
1975 (telephone); Oklahoma City-Patience Latting, Mayor, Aug. 30, 1974; Omaha-
Larry L. Wewel, Personnel Director, Aug. 5, 1974; Portland, Ore.-George Yerkovich, City
Auditor, July 30, 1974; San Diego-City Clerk, July 18, 1974; Tampa-Jocelyn W. Elkes,
Dep. Personnel Director, Civ. Serv. Bd., Sept. 9, 1974; Tulsa-City Clerk, Aug. 6, 1974;
Wash., D.C.-Ira N. Kellogg, Jr., Ass't Exec. Secretary, Aug. 14, 1974.
18. BUFFALO, N.Y., CODE ch. I, § 4 (1939); CHICAGO, ILL., CODE § 25-30 (1939); Detroit,
Mich., Ordinance No. 327-G, June 6, 1968; EL PAso, TEx., CHARTER art. X, § 16 (1935);
Kansas City, Mo., Personnel Rules and Regs. VIII, § 8.4 (1974); Los Angeles, Cal.,
Ordinance No. 143,025, Jan. 20, 1972; Miami, Fla., Ordinance 6945, Dec. 15, 1961, as
amended, May 1, 1965; MILWAUKEE, Wis., CITY CHARTER § 5.02 (1971); NEVARK, N.J.,
CODE § 2.14 (1959); Philadelphia, Pa., Ordinance Prescribing Residence Qualifications
for Employees in the Civil Service § 2, Apr. 16, 1953; PIrrsBURGH, PA., CHARTER ORDINANCE
450, § 42 (1902); ST. Louis, Mo., CODE art. VIII, § 2 (1960); San Francisco, Cal., Ordinance
No. 204-71, Aug. 6, 1971, as amended, Ordinance No. 290-71, Nov. 23, 1971; ToLEDo,
OHIO, CHARTER ch. V, § 61 (1972).
New York state law greatly undercuts the impact of the Buffalo city residency re-
quirement, for employees in the police, fire and sanitation departments and teachers,
among others, have been exempted from the local charter provision. N.Y. PUB. OFFICERS
LAW, art. 2, § 3 (McKinney Supp. 1973). The Philadelphia, Pa., city residency ordinance,
supra, is typical of a strict continuing residency requirement, stating in part:
Every employee in the Civil Service of the City shall be required to maintain his
bona fide residence in the City during the continuance of his employment by the
City.
19. Birmingham, Ala., Ordinance 68-32, June 15, 1968; CINCINNATI, OHIO, CODE art.
XVII, § 1 (1967); MEMPHIs, TENN., CHARTER § 190 (1963); Nashville, Tenn., Civ. Serv.
Comm'n Rules ch. 5, § 1 (1972); New Orleans, La., Ordinance 5240, Aug. 27, 1973; San
Antonio, Tex., Ordinance 35,501, June 8, 1967; San Jose, Cal., Ordinance 16043, Jan.
17, 1972.
One typical county residency regulation, that of San Antonio, Tex., supra, states in part:
[B]efore being appointed to a position with the City of San Antonio, [applicants]
must reside within [Bexar] County and must continue to reside therein during
their tenure as employees of the City....
20. CoLumBus, OHIO, CHARTER § 158-1 (1971).
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restricts workers to residence within a specified radius of the city.2 1
Many residency requirements apply only to particular types of em-
ployees, typically policemen and firemen. Members of these emer-
gency services may be required to maintain their homes within the
city, the county,22 a multicounty zone,23 or a certain mileage radius
of the city.2 4 A few cities have "hybrid" residency restrictions for police
and firemen.
2 5
The residence policies of several major cities do not fall into the
categories above. Two cities require certain key nonemergency per-
sonnel to live within municipal boundaries,26 an extension of the
residency regulations affecting only policymaking governmental "of-
ficers. 2'27 One city uses domicile as a criterion only in hiring by giving
official preference to residents.28 Other city governments give informal
preference to residents in hiring and encourage current employees
to maintain city or county residence, even though there are no
statutory residence requirements.
2 9
While the focus of this survey has been larger cities, many small
municipalities have enacted residency restrictions for their civil ser-
21. San Jose allows residence within a 80-mile radius as an alternative to county
residence for all employees. San Jose, Cal., Ordinance 16043, Jan. 17, 1972.
22. Kansas City, Kansas, police and firemen may live within the county, while other
employees must live within the city. KANSAS CiTY, KAN., CODE § 9(3) (1973). (Note that
Kansas City, Kansas, is not one of the 50 largest cities.)
23. St. Paul, Minn., Ordinance 3250, § 10, Sept. 1, 1973.
24. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 48, § 58E (1972), ch. 41, § 99A (1971) (mileage radius
for police and firemen in Boston and all other Massachusetts cities and towns); Louis-
ville Civ. Serv. Bd. requirement (uncodified either by ordinance or rule-letter from
Jerry W. Lee, Job Analyst, Civ. Serv. Bd., Aug. 30, 1974). See IND. CODE § 19-1-2-1 (1971).
The radii adopted differ with each city, possibly reflecting the geographical terrain
and population density of the metropolitan areas. Compare the Massachusetts residency
laws, supra (10 miles) with the Louisville requirement, supra (30 miles). In Louisville
different jobs have different radii; the city utilizes a 20-mile radius for police and a 30-
mile radius for firemen. Letter from Jerry W. Lee, supra.
25. Indiana state law requires police and firemen in Indianapolis and other cities
to live within the county in which their city of employment is located. Residence must
be within 15 miles of city limits as well. IND. CODE § 19-1-2-1 (1971).
26. Phoenix, Ariz., Admin. Reg. 2.81, §§ 1-4, Sept. 28, 1972; RocHESTR, N.Y., CHARTER
§ 2-17 (1973). The Phoenix residency requirement affects employees who properly may
be called officers, e.g., department heads and their chief assistants, but also includes
employees of lesser rank, e.g., certain librarians and administrative assistants.
27. See note 2 supra, for the definition of governmental "officer."
28. Seattle residency rules pertain only to applicants for city jobs, extending an
official preference in hiring to residents. SEATTLE, WASH., CHARTER art. XVI, §§ 6, 8, 27
(1962). (However, Washington state statutes prohibit discrimination because of lack of
residency in selection of police and firemen. WASH. REv. CODE §§ 41.12.075, 41.08.075
(1972).) Once Seattle employees meet application residency standards, they presumably
may migrate outside of the city.
29. Letter from Chuck Gebuhr, Research Director, City-County Council of Indian-
apolis-Marion County, July 11, 1974 (with respect to nonuniformed services employees);
letter from Patience Latting, Mayor, Oklahoma City, Aug. 30, 1974.
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vants.a0 Reference to residency litigation reveals that some small
cities, towns and even villages extend employment to residents only.31
II. The "Substantial Relation" Test and Possible Violation of the
Right to Travel
Residency laws discriminate between two classes of individuals
otherwise eligible for municipal employment-residents and nonresi-
dents. Courts32 have most frequently questioned residency require-
ments on the ground that such discrimination may violate the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.33 There is disagree-
ment, however, as to the proper equal protection formula for testing
the permissibility of the discrimination between residents and non-
residents in light of the offered justifications. Some courts have
tested the residency laws only by the "minimum rationality" test,
3 4
while others have used the standard of "strict scrutiny."
35
30. Smaller governmental units in the United States seem to insist upon residency
as a condition of employment with roughly the same frequency as do the 50 largest
cities. Fifty-five percent of all cities have some kind of residency requirement for their
employees. See BNA MUNICIPAL YEARBOOK 160 (1967) (table 2); BNA MUNICIPAL YEAR-
BOOK 181 (1970) (table 12); BNA MUNICIPAL YEARBOOK 187 (1971); Note, Residency Re-
quirements for Municipal Employees: Denial of a Right to Commute?, supra note 15,
at 511 n.1l, cited in Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 13, Ector v. City of Torrance, 415
U.S. 935 (1974).
31. See, e.g., the residency restrictions at issue in Ector v. City of Torrance, 10 Cal.
3d 129, 514 P.2d 433, 109 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1973); Quigley v. Village of Blanchester, 16
Ohio App. 2d 104, 242 N.E.2d 589 (1968); Marabuto v. Town of Emeryville, 183 Cal.
App. 2d 406, 6 Cal. Rptr. 690 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960).
32. See, e.g., Wright v. City of Jackson, 506 F.2d 900 (5th Cir. 1975); Krzewinski v.
Kugler, 338 F. Supp. 492 (D.N.J. 1972); Ector v. City of Torrance, 10 Cal. 3d 129, 514
P.2d 433, 109 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1973); Donnelly v. City of Manchester, 111 N.H. 50, 274
A.2d 789 (1971); Abrahams v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 65 N.J. 61, 319 A.2d 483 (1974).
33. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1: "[N]or shall any State... deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
34. The minimum rationality test, the oldest of equal protection standards, simply
demands that the legislative classification be a rational means of advancing some per-
missible legislative purpose. This requirement is easily satisfied and the courts rarely
have upheld equal protection challenges under the minimum rationality test. For a
detailed discussion of this equal protection test, see Developments in the Law-Equal
Protection, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1065 (1969). See also McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420
(1961); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911). Many of the earlier
municipal employee residency cases invoked a minimum rationality test. See, e.g., Ken-
nedy v. City of Newark, 29 N.J. 178, 148 A.2d 473 (1959). The Kennedy court noted:
"If there is a rational basis for a residence requirement in furtherance of the public
welfare, the constitutional issue must be resolved in favor of the legislative power to
ordain it." Id. at 183, 148 A.2d at 476. In Kennedy the selection of this test resulted in
the preservation of the challenged ordinance. Several recent municipal employee residency
cases similarly have employed a "rational basis" test to uphold such requirements. Ector
v. City of Torrance, 10 Cal. 3d 129, 514 P.2d 433, 109 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1973); Abrahams
v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 65 N.J. 61, 319 A.2d 483 (1974).
35. Under the strict scrutiny equal protection test, legislation which contains a
classification deemed to be "suspect" or which impinges upon a "fundamental" right
denies equal protection unless there is a compelling state interest advanced by the
classification. Relatively few state interests have been held to be compelling. See gen-
erally Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Developments in the Law, supra note
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Debate over the appropriate equal protection standard has hinged
on whether residency requirements burden any fundamental interest.
Once it is determined that a fundamental interest is abridged, a court
must invoke strict scrutiny to see whether the abridging law serves
a compelling state interest. The right to travel, deemed a fundamental
interest under Shapiro v. Thompson," has been held to be abrogated
in several cases because residency laws affected the ability of municipal
workers to travel outside the city.37 Presumably, some resident munici-
34. The Supreme Court has deemed several classifications suspect; they include race
(see, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)) and alienage (see, e.g., Graham
v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971)). Among the recognized fundamental interests are the
right to vote (see Kraemer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969)) and the
right to interstate travel (see, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, supra). Several courts in the
municipal employee residency requirement context have invoked the strict scrutiny test.
See, e.g., Krzewinski v. Kugler, 338 F. Supp. 492 (D.N.J. 1972); Donnelly v. City of
Manchester, 111 N.H. 50, 274 A.2d 789 (1971). These courts determined that residency
requirements burdened the affected employees' fundamental right to travel. Donnelly
invalidated the city residency requirement; Krzewinski determined that the state had
a compelling interest in insisting upon the residency of municipal police and firemen.
36. 394 U.S. 618, 629-30 (1968). The right of an individual to move freely from one
state to another has long been protected by the Constitution. Crandall v. Nevada, 73
U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 43 (1867); Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 274 (1900); Twining v.
New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 97 (1908); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 180 (1941) (Doug-
las, J., concurring); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757-58 (1965); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-30 (1968); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 285 (1970);
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1971); Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S.
250 (1974). In Shapiro v. Thompson, the Court declared that
the nature of our Federal Union and our constitutional concepts of personal liberty
unite to require that all citizens be free to travel throughout the length and breadth
of our land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations which unreasonably burden
or restrict this movement.
394 U.S. at 629.
While the Constitution does not provide explicitly for a right to travel, the Court has
anchored this right in several texts: (1) the due process clauses of the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments: Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 14 (1965); Aptheker v. Secretary of
State, 378 U.S. 500, 505 (1963); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125 (1957); Williams v.
Fears, supra; (2) the "privileges and immunities" clause (U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1,
amend. XIV): Twining v. New Jersey, supa; Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 180
(1868); Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F . 546, 552 (No. 8280) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823); and (3) the
commerce clause (U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c. 8): Edwards v. California, supra; Crandall v.Nevada, supra at 49 (Clifford, J., concurring).
In light of United States v. Guest, 883 U.S. 745 (1965), debate as to the precise con-
stitutional source of the right to interstate travel may be superfluous. After noting that"there have been recurring differences in emphasis within the Court as to the source
of the constitutional right of interstate travel," Guest stated that there was no need"to canvass those differences further" since "as have agreed that the right exists."88 U.S. at 759. Similarly, the Shapiro Court found "no occasion to ascribe the source
of this right to travel to a particular Constitutional provision." Shapiro v. Thompson,supra at 629-80. See also Note, Residence Requirements after Shapiro v. Thompson, 70
CoLUrM. L. REV. 184 (1970); Note, Shapiro v. Thompson: Travel, Welfare and the Con-stitution, 44 N.Y.U.L. REV. 989 (1969).7. See, e.g., Krzewinski v. Kugler, 888 F. Supp. 492, 498 (D.N.J. 1972); Donnelly v.
City of Manchester, 1ll N.H. 50, 274 A.2d 789 (1971). See also Abrahams v. Civil Serv.omm'n, 65 N.J. 61, 77, 319 A.2d 48, 491 (1974) (Pashman, J., dissenting). The rightto travel is the only established fundamental interest that courts in residency cases haveconsidered. But Hanson v. Unified School Dist, 64 F. Supp. 880 (D. Kan. 1978), whichoverturned a county residency rere ment, invoked other somewhat dubious "funda-mental" interests, viz., the right to work and the right to live where one choo nes.Some courts have refused to accept the notion that residency requirements are a viola.
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pal employees would move out of the city in exercise of their right
to travel were it not for the threat of dismissal.38
Several courts in municipal employee litigation have argued that
the right to travel is not burdened because residency requirements
merely obstruct employees' ability to commute. They reason that
there is no fundamental "right to commute" 39 and that Shapiro in-
volved only migration,40 not movement each working day from home
to place of employment. Yet the travel involved can be characterized
as not merely commutation but migration as well. Residency restric-
tions prevent relocation of one's family and possessions in much the
same sense that concerned the Shapiro Court.
Another attempted distinction has been that Shapiro struck down
only the "durational" element of the challenged welfare residency
requirements-residence for a certain length of time as a prerequisite
to receiving aid. The Shapiro Court did declare that "[t]he residence
requirement and the one-year waiting-period are distinct and inde-
pendent prerequisites." 4' Subsequently, Justice Marshall, writing for
the majority in Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County,42 stated that
only the durational prerequisite for welfare was held to be uncon-
stitutional in Shapiro. A recent municipal employee residency case
relied on these statements to uphold a challenged residency restric-
tion.4 3 Yet other courts have found that Shapiro's durational focus
is not controlling.44 Further, it might be argued that employee resi-
dency requirements do impose a type of waiting period or durational
requirement-not in the form of a condition precedent upon persons
migrating into the city, but as a "condition subsequent" to employ-
ment upon persons who would like to migrate out.
45
tion of the right to travel. See, e.g., Wright v. City of Jackson, 506 F.2d 900 (5th Cir.
1975); Ector v. City of Torrance, 10 Cal. 3d 129, 514 P.2d 433, 109 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1973);
Abrahams v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 65 N.J. 61, 319 A.2d 483 (1974).
38. Krzewinski v. Kugler, 338 F. Supp. 492, 498 (D.N.J. 1972).
39. In Ector v. City of Torrance, 10 Cal. 3d 129, 514 P.2d 433, 436, 109 Cal. Rptr.
849 (1973) the court stated:
[Aippellant is claiming the right to "travel" between his home and his place of
employment . . . each working day-in other words, a "right to commute." We
cannot discern such a right in the United States Supreme Court decisions ....
See also Wright v. City of Jackson, 506 F.2d 900, 902 (5th Cir. 1975).
40. See 394 U.S. at 629.
41. Id. at 636.
42. 415 U.S. 250, 255 (1974).
43. Abrahams v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 65 N.J. 61, 66-68, 319 A.2d 403, 485-87 (1974).
44. See, e.g., Krzewinski v. Kugler, 338 F. Supp. 492, 497-99 (D.N.J. 1972).
45. See Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 20, Ector v. City of Torrance, 415 U.S. 935
(1974). The invocation of the right to travel to defeat a continuing residency restriction
could open a Pandora's box, for the logical extension of this argument might seem to
bar continuing residency requirements in contexts other than public employment. Many
public benefits and services, including welfare payments and schools, are tied to the
resident status of recipients.
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A third possible ground for distinguishing the employee residency
laws is that Shapiro involved interstate rather than intrastate travel. 40
Admittedly, much of the travel inhibited by employee residence re-
strictions involves only intrastate migration. Nevertheless, many major
American cities are situated close to state lines, and residency require-
ments in such cities do in fact impede employees' ability to move to
homes across the state borders.47 In addition, a right to intrastate
However, it may be possible to distinguish municipal jobs from other governmental
benefits. When a family moves from one municipal unit to another, its children ordi-
narily may enroll in the schools of the new locale. Similarly, the welfare recipient, if
he exercises his right to travel, will often be able to qualify for benefits in the new
jurisdiction. Many welfare programs are state-administered with uniform eligibility
standards. See 1 CCH Pov. L. REP. ff 1010 (1974); Wedemeyer & Moore, The American
Welfare System, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 326 (1966). Thus intrastate movement need not result
in a loss in benefits. Shapiro v. Thompson clearly prohibits unreasonable durational
residency requirements, which might constitute the principal barrier to placement on
the welfare rolls of a new state. 394 U.S. 618 (1969). Here, as with schools, there is
little "penalty" for the exercise of the right to travel.
The situation is different when municipal jobs are involved. When a continuing resi-
dency requirement causes an employee to lose his job upon exercise of his freedom to
travel, he will have to take civil service tests in the new municipal unit, with attendant
risk of failure; if the individual passes, he will still have to wait until a job opening oc-
curs. He will lose any seniority and accrued pension benefits attained on his old job. He
may be unable to obtain a comparable public job at all, if he happens to move into a
municipality which is in the midst of a hiring freeze. The continuing residency re-
quirement thus imposes a considerable penalty on the public employee who decides to
utilize his right to travel.
Constitutional rejection of continuing residency requirements in public employment
thus need not be used as precedent for similar attacks on residency laws for welfare
benefits, schools, parks, police and fire protection, or other local benefits.
46. The Court has not had occasion to decide whether the constitutionally protected
right to travel applies to movement from one location to another within the same
state. See Wright v. City of Jackson, 506 F.2d 900, 902 (5th Cir. 1975); Abrahams v. Civil
Serv. Comm'n, 65 N.J. 61, 69, 319 A.2d 483, 487 (1974) ("[t]he [Shapiro] Court express-
ly left open the matter of any distinction beween interstate and intrastate travel . . ").
In Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 255-56 (1974), the Court refused
to consider whether there is a right to intrastate travel, even though it bad the oppor-
tunity to do so. But see King v. New Rochelle Municipal Housing Authority, 442 F.2d
646, 648 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 863 (1971); Cole v. Housing Authority, 435
F.2d 807 (Ist Cir. 1970). Dicta in Shapiro describes the right to travel in broad terms.
394 U.S. at 629-30. For citizens to be able to travel "throughout .. . our land" seemingly
would require the extension of the right to travel to an intrastate dimension.
While it may be impossible, and indeed unnecessary, to ascribe the right to travel to
a specific clause in the Constitution (see note 36 supra), at least two of the possible
sources arguably authorize constitutional protection of intrastate travel. Relatively little
commerce is so removed from interstate commerce that it remains outside the regu-
latory power of the commerce clause. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294
(1964); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). If the right to travel is put on commerce
clause footing, it could extend to movement which physically is intrastate but which
can be said to affect interstate travel. Similarly, if the due process clauses constitute
the foundation for the right to travel, it is difficult to see why intrastate travel should
be any less a part of 'ordered liberty' than is interstate travel. Thus there would need to
be weighty interests to counterbalance the inhibition of even intrastate travel. See Zemel
v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965). It is highly questionable whether the objectives of the
residency requirements are important enough to justify such inhibition. See pp. 1695-1701
infra. It might be more difficult to make a case for intrastate travel under the privileges
and immunities clause.
47. Municipal employees of Philadelphia, for example, would face discharge if they
moved to nearby New Jersey or Delaware, states within easy commuting distance. Major
American cities located very close to state borders include Chicago, Jacksonville, Kansas
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travel is in a sense a necessary concomitant to a constitutional right
to interstate travel, if such protected interstate travel is not peculiarly
to stop once the border is traversed .
4
A plausible argument thus can be made that residency requirements
abridge the fundamental right to travel so as to invoke the strict
scrutiny formula. The Supreme Court, however, has declined to rule
on the scope of that right, twice refusing to hear municipal employee
residency cases.49 The appeal in Detroit Police Officers Association
v. City of Detroit5O was dismissed "for want of a substantial federal
question,"'51 which some courts5 2 read as an implicit holding that
residency laws do not violate any fundamental rights. Nevertheless, in
Detroit Police Officers, the appellants briefed and argued only a
claimed "right to live where [one] chooses," rather than the right to
travel.53 As a response to such a characterization of the employees'
interest, the dismissal of Detroit Police Officers need not be taken
as certain rejection by the Supreme Court of the applicability of the
right to travel.5
4
One means of circumventing the more troublesome dimensions of
the right to travel argument against residency laws may lie in the
intermediate equal protection test recently developed by the Supreme
Court, which requires a level of scrutiny lying between the extremes
of minimum rationality and compelling state interest. This "sub-
stantial relation" test 5 entails intensive inquiry into whether a leg-
City, Louisville, Minneapolis, New York City, Newark, Omaha, Philadelphia, St. Louis,
St. Paul, Toledo, and Washington, D.C. Of these 13 cities, only five do not require
residence of their workers. See note 17 supra. Abrahams v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 65 N.J.
61, 319 A.2d 483 (1974), did not consider the possibility that the Newark ordinance
penalized interstate travel between New Jersey and New York.
48. As the Second Circuit noted,
It would be meaningless to describe the right to travel between the states as a
fundamental precept of personal liberty and not to acknowledge a correlative
constitutional right to travel within a state.
King v. New Rochelle Municipal Housing Authority, 442 F.2d 646, 648 (2d Cir. 1971)
(invalidating durational residency requirement for admission to public housing). See
also Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 14-24, Ector v. City of Torrance, 415 U.S. 935
(1974).
49. See note 14 supra.
50. 405 U.S. 950 (1972).
51. Id.
52. See Ahern v. Murphy, 457 F.2d 363 (7th Cir. 1972); Ector v. City of Torrance,
10 Cal. 3d 129, 135, 514 P.2d 433, 436, 109 Cal. Rptr. 849, 852 (1973).
53. Brief for Appellant at 10, Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. City of Detroit, 405
U.S. 950 (1972).
54. See Note, Residency Requirements for Municipal Employees: Denial of Right to
Commute?, supra note 15, at 530-31.
55. Professor Gunther has provided the fullest discussion of this intermediate equal
protection formula. See Gunther, Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing
Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1972). He denomi-
nates the test as the "means-focused" formula, since the legislative means must bear
substantial relation to permissible legislative purposes. This Note, however, will desig-
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islative classification actually furthers the purposes of the challenged
law.56 Preservation of residency laws under this test would require
that such ordinances, statutes and regulations advance substantiallyl7
their stated or apparent purposes.
The substantial relation test previously has been applied in situa-
tions involving arguably suspect classifications or arguably funda-
mental rights. The test is useful where important interests lurk under
the surface but where the Court is reluctant to commit itself to strict
scrutiny in the future by adding to the list of fundamental interests
or expanding the scope of interests already denominated as funda-
mental. 5s While the municipal employee residency restrictions argu-
nate the test as the "substantial relation" test. This name better describes the central
feature of the test, which focuses not so much on the legislative means themselves, as
on their relation to their ends.
56. The substantial relation test is the product of recent terms of the Supreme
Court. Apparently, the Court has felt uncomfortable with the traditional bifurcated
approach to equal protection analysis, especially with the extreme deference required
by the minimum rationality formula. The new test seemingly requires less indulgence
toward hypothetical explanations of what some reasonable legislature might have had
as its purpose, and instead looks at actual purpose. As Professor Gunther notes, "Ju-
dicial deference to a broad range of conceivable legislative purposes and to imaginable
facts that might justify classifications is strikingly diminished." Gunther, supra note
55, at 20. Substantial relation analysis usually assumes, however, that the purposes
underlying the statutory classification are permissible goals. The Court proceeds to
examine whether in fact the legislative means promotes its purported purposes. Id.
at 20-24.
The Court has invoked the "substantial relation" test repeatedly since the 1971-1972
term. See, e.g., Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S.
351 (1974); Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur,
414 U.S. 632, 651-57 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973)
(White, J., concurring); San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
1, 70-137 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting); James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972); Humphrey
v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Reed v. Reed,
404 U.S. 71 (1971). See also Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973) (arguably invoking
the intermediate equal protection test); Note, The Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine in
the Supreme Court, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1534, 1535 n.9 (1973) (noting the continuing
vitality of the new test).
57. The issue remains as to how far the legislative classification must further its
purposes. Clearly, the substantial relation test is not satisfied if the challenged law
only "minimally" advances its objectives, since the new equal protection test reflects
Supreme Court disenchantment with the traditional minimum rationality formula. See
Gunther, supra note 55, at 20. It is similarly questionable whether "some" rational
basis for the classification is enough to satisfy the substantial relation test. Rather, the
legislative means must bear a "significant relationship" to the state's purpose (see
Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972) (emphasis added)), or must
contribute substantially to its achievement (see Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971)).
The substantial relation test frequently demands empirical evidence showing that
the statute promotes its objectives. See Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974); Gunther,
supra note 55, at 20-21, 46-48. The test apparently cannot be met by arguments based
on hypothetical facts or by reference to conditions that "more likely than not" exist.
58. In Reed v. Reed, for example, the Court could have invoked the strict scrutiny
test by holding that sex constituted a suspect classification. 404 U.S. 71 (1971). Similarly,
in Eisenstadt v. Baird, the right to privacy might have been designated an abrogated
fundamental right. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). In municipal employee residency litigation,
the right to travel could be "expanded" to cover intrastate migration and postappoint-
ment residency requirements so as to trigger strict scrutiny. In such instances, however,
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ably penalize the exercise of the right to travel, courts naturally are
reluctant to extend the scope of that right. That there still are ques-
tions whether freedom to travel includes intrastate migration and
whether postappointment residency requirements abrogate that free-
dom makes the substantial relation equal protection formula par-
ticularly appropriate for the question of municipal employee residency
requirements.
This Note next seeks to apply the substantial relation test to the
major purposes underlying the municipal employee residency require-
ments. Inquiry will focus primarily on whether these laws promote
the objectives of their framers. From a policy perspective, determina-
tion that the residency laws may not further the municipal goals also
invites suggestion of alternative means of attaining these ends.
III. Are the Purposes of Residency Requirements Realized?
The municipal employee residency laws and cases reveal three major
purposes for residency requirements:59 (a) to enhance the availability
of emergency manpower; (b) to protect the public coffer; and (c) to
promote identity with the community on the part of city workers60
the availability of the substantial relation equal protection test may make strict scrutiny
unneces'ary, because the challenged statute will not withstand intermediate scrutiny.
To date, no court in municipal employee residency litigation has explicitly invoked
the substantial relation equal protection test. Hanson v. Unified School Dist., 364 F.
Stpp. 330 (D. Kan. 1973), may have utilized this test, though in a somewhat confusing
fashion. Other courts of course have examined whether the residency laws promote
their purposes, without making clear the test by which the "fit" of purpose and means
would be gauged. See, e.g., Krzewinski v. Kugler, 338 F. Supp. 492, 499-501 (D.N.J.
1972); Donnelly v. City of Manchester, 111 N.H. 50, 52-53, 274 A.2d 789, 791 (1971). See
also Abrahams v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 65 N.J. 61, 88, 319 A.2d 483 (1974) (Pashman,
J., dissenting).
59. Local legislative histories or city council minutes, which might reveal most ac-
curately the actual purposes of residency laws, are either nonexistent or else not readily
available. Nevertheless, there are some criteria for attributing purposes to the residency
requirements. One can analyze (I) the invocation of purposes in litigation supporting
such laws against challenge; (2) the language of the residency laws and the natural
consequences of the laws; and (3) comments by public officials and other background
information which suggest the motivation for enactment of such requirements. Cf. Note,
Legislative Purpose, Rationality, and Equal Protection, 82 YALE L.J. 123 (1972).
60. Occasionally, rationales other than those in the text are offered in litigation in
support of employee residency requirements, though these are often variations on the
three major purposes. For a lengthy list of supposed purposes of the residency restric-
tions, see Ector v. City of Torrance, 10 Cal. 3d 129, 514 P.2d 433, 109 Cal. Rptr. 849
(1973); Abrahams v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 65 N.J. 61, 319 A.2d 483 (1974). A favorite
tactic of municipal units in residency litigation seems to be the enumeration of a
"laundry list" of rationales. Presumably, the hope is that the court will find at least
one of the offered purposes acceptable. In Ector the defendant city offered seven
rationales, all of which the Supreme Court of California found to have a "rational
basis." Ector v. City of Torrance, 10 Cal. 3d at 135, 514 P.2d at 436, 109 Cal. Rptr. at
852. In contrast, the dissenter in Abrahams rejected each purpose on the same list as
being without even a rational basis. Abrahams v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 65 N.J. at 87-90,
19 A.2d at 497-98 (Pashman, J., dissenting).
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A. Emergency Manpower
One of the prime purposes of the residency restrictions is to ensure
the availability of emergency manpower. 61 Many of the requirements
apply only to police and firemen, since they are considered the usual
source of emergency personnel.0 2 Even for those cities which insist
upon the residency of all employees, the emergency manpower ra-
tionale probably underlies the restrictions in part. The rationale rests
upon two assumptions: that employees living outside the city are
farther removed geographically from their place of employment than
city residents and are less able to report promptly for emergency duty
because of the obstacles posed by heavy traffic, weather or civil dis-
orders. These assumptions have only limited validity.
Some persons living outside the city will live closer to city hall,
their precinct or other place of employment than do some city resi-
dents. 3 The assumption that municipal residents live in closer geo-
graphical proximity to work would be always true only if the munici-
pal borders were a perfect circle with the place of employment at
its center. Many major cities have irregular borders, 4 while municipal
offices, firehouses and other buildings are often scattered throughout
the political jurisdiction. 5 A nonresident, though further from his
place of work by air miles, may be closer in road distance or in time.
The nonresident may live along a less congested or circuitous route
than the resident, or may have more efficient mass transportation
available. Factual investigation seems requisite in each case to de-
termine whether or not the residency requirement bears a substantial
relation to the emergency manpower objective. 66
61. In Krzewinski v. Kugler, 338 F. Supp. 492 (D.N.J. 1972), the court gave the fol-
lowing explanation of the "emergency manpower" rationale:
Police and firemen must be able to respond to emergencies timely without fail. It
is precisely during time of natural disaster, riot, or public conflagration that com-
muting to work would be most difficult.
338 F. Supp. at 499 n.6. The Krzewinski court did not accept the emergency manpower
rationale as sufficient. Kennedy v. City of Newark, 29 N.J. 178, 148 A,2d 473 (1959),
seems to be the first case to invoke the emergency manpower purpose to sustain a
residency requirement. See also Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. City of Detroit, 385
Mich. 519, 190 N.W.2d 97 (1971); Abrahams v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 65 N.J. 319 A.2d
483 (1974).
62. See p. 1688 supra. Cities with residency requirements applicable only to police
and firemen presumably would be motivated chiefly by emergency manpower considera-
tions.
63. The court in Krzewinski v. Kugler, 338 F. Supp. 492, 499 (D.N.J. 1972), recog-
nized that "geographical proximity cannot logically be equated with municipal borders."
64. See, e.g., RAND MCNALLY & Co., ROAD ATLAS 20 (1974) (map of Los Angeles), 70
(map of New York City).
65. New Haven, for example, has its municipal offices situated throughout the city,
though many are in the central downtown area. See SOuTHERN NEw ENGLAND TELErHONE
Co., BOOK OF NAFS: NEw HAVEN 252-53 (1974) (listing of City of New Haven municipal
offices).
66. The emergency manpower rationale may be somewhat plausible when applied
to a narrow class of workers, specifically police and firemen. See notes 22-25 supra.
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A preferred approach to any based solely on political jurisdiction
or solely on distance would be a formula combining radius and time. 7
The city might, for example, require domicile within a specified road
mile radius from place of employment coupled with a limit on rush
hour commutation time. No city or state has yet employed a temporal
element in delineating a permissible residence zone.68 Alternatively,
the municipality could require the nonresident employee to demon-
strate that he has an "adequate" means of transportation into the
city"9 or could set standards for employee availability. Finally, evi-
denced inability to respond promptly to emergency summonses pre-
sumably constitutes just cause for dismissal from the municipal payroll.
B. Public Coffer Theory
The public coffer rationale70 rests on the idea that the resources of
a municipality belong to its residents and that residents legitimately
are preferred in the distribution of such resources. City residents are
said to contribute the tax revenues from which the salaries of workers
are drawn;71 resident workers are presumed to support the local
economy.
72
But residency laws which apply to all municipal employees are too crudely tailored to
further the availability of emergency personnel and should be invalid, under that
rationale, because of overinclusiveness. On the character of overinclusive classifications,
see Tussman 9: tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALiF. L. Rav. 341,
351-53 (1949). To require a teacher to maintain city domicile because of emergency
manpower concerns would be an instance of overinclusiveness, because teachers ordi-
narily are not called upon to render services in times of civil disorder or disaster. For
discussion of overinclusiveness in residency requirements, see Donnelly v. City of Man-
chester, 111 N.H. 50, 52, 274 A.2d 789, 791 (1971); Abrahams v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 65
N.J. 61, 88-90, 319 A.2d 483, 498 (1974) (Pashman, J., dissenting).
67. Krzewinski v. Kugler, 338 F. Supp. 492, 499 (D.N.J. 1972), suggests similarly that
the "state interest in proximity might be served by a time or distance radius compu-
tation."
68. Mapping an acceptable time and radius zone admittedly could be an adminis-
trative burden, since reliance on employees' estimates of time and distance might be
imprudent.
69. E.g., IND. CODE § 19-1-2-1 (1971), which requires police and firemen to live
within the city limits unless they have "adequate means of transportation into [the] city
and maintain in [their] residence[s] telephone service with the city." If transportation
and telephone service are adequate, then residence within a county/radial zone is per-
mitted. See note 25 supra.
70. For a concise explanation of the public coffer theory, see Krzewinski v. Kugler,
338 F. Supp. 492, 498 n.4 (D.N.J. 1972).
71. See, e.g., Donnelly v. City of Manchester, 111 N.H. 50, 52, 274 A.2d 789, 792
(1971). The Donnelly court found this rationale to be unconvincing. Note, however, the
debate over a residency law in Denver, as recounted by the Denver City Clerk's Office:
"It was recently brought up in a Charter Revision meeting that city and county em-
ployees should live within the boundaries since they are being paid by Denver city
and county taxes." Letter from Terri McClellan, City Clerk's Office, City and County
of Denver, July 5, 1974 (emphasis added).
72. See, e.g., Kennedy v. City of Newark, 29 N.J. 178, 184, 148 A.2d 473, 476 (1959).
In the debate over proposed residency legislation in New York, Mayor Beame of New
York City argued that the city's economy would benefit from expenditures by resident
employees. N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1974, at 37, col. 7.
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Yet many cities tax the income of residents and nonresidents alike.73
Nonresidents often are subject to other forms of municipal taxation,
such as sales or excise taxes.74 Residents do not invariably buy more
goods and services in the city than do nonresidents. Many cities have
bordering suburbs that are relatively undeveloped commercially; sub-
urban residents may depend upon stores in the urban center for major
consumer purchases. In addition, city residents who live close to the
city limits may prefer shopping in suburban areas because prices and
sales taxes are lower or stores are less crowded. In short, the assump-
tion that city residents alone bear the tax burden of the city and
advance the local economy must be subjected to factual investigation;
residency requirements may lack a substantial relation to the pur-
ported public coffer rationale.
Even if it can be shown that the residency requirements do, in
fact, further public coffer objectives, the rationale itself may possess
only questionable vitality in light of recent judicial attacks .7  More-
73. Cities which tax the income earned by nonresidents within city borders and
require residence of municipal employees include Cincinnati, Columbus, Detroit, Kansas
City, Mo., Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, St. Louis, San Francisco, and Toledo. See Note,
Municipal Income Taxes, 28 ACAD. POL. SCL PRoc. 423, 442-45 (1968); Note, Validity
of San Francisco's Commuter Tax, 20 HASTNcs L.J. 813 (1969).
74. Furthermore, many cities receive substantial revenue from the county, state and
federal governments. An employee who lives outside the city may be a resident and
taxpayer of these larger jurisdictions. See Hanson v. Unified School Dist., 364 F. Supp.
330, 333 (D. Kan. 1973).
75. Inquiry into the constitutional permissibility of the public coffer theory entails
a slight divergence from substantial relation analysis, which ordinarily assumes that
the legislative purposes are valid. See note 56 supra.
Some courts in residency litigation have questioned whether the public coffer ra-
tionale is any longer a permissible governmental purpose. See, e.g., Hanson v. United
School Dist., 364 F. Supp. 333 (D. Kan. 1973); Krzewinski v. Kugler, 338 F. Supp. 492
(D.N.J. 1972); Donnelly v. City of Manchester, 111 N.H. 50, 274 A.2d 789 (1971). But
see Ector v. City of Torrance, 10 Cal. 3d 129, 514 P.2d 433, 109 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1973);
Abrahams v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 65 N.J. 61, 319 A.2d 483 (1974). Such skepticism can
be based on language of the Supreme Court which treats the public coffer rationale with
some distaste and which arguably may assume the purpose of allocating benefits to
individuals according to their tax or economic contribution to be violative of equal
protection. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372-75 (1971); Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618, 632-33 (1969); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 645 (1973).
Graham concerned state statutes which barred aliens from eligibility for welfare
benefits. The Court rejected the public coffer theory as a purpose insufficiently com-
pelling to sustain the use of the suspect classification of aliens, stating as well that
there was "doubt [about] the continuing validity of the . . . doctrine in all contexts."
403 U.S. at 374 (emphasis added). Though this dictum must be considered in its own
context, the broad reach of its language may be intentional.
Shapiro involved state statutes which denied welfare assistance to residents who had
not resided within the governmental unit at least one year. Again, the public coffer
theory constituted one of the principal rationales in favor of the plan. The state
contended that one-year residents should be favored "on the basis of the contribution
they have made to the community through the payment of taxes." 394 U.S. at 632. The
Shapiro Court, however, rejected the rationale, questioning whether it was a "consti-
tutionally permissible state objective." Id. at 633. The rejection of the public coffer
purpose in Shapiro may reach to municipal worker residency requirements as well.
It may be argued that the Court rejected the public coffer doctrine in Graham and
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over, there is no convincing reason to justify allocation of jobs solely
on the basis of present tax contributions. Individuals who were long-
time inhabitants of a city but recently migrated from it may have
contributed more to the municipal unit in tax revenues and consumer
expenditures than the new arrival. Finally, what remaining strength
the public coffer rationale may have in the case of transfer payments
or city services seems less convincing in the case of jobs. If employees
are presumed to perform work that justifies the cost of their salaries,
then the city loses none of its resources by employing nonresidents.
C. Community Identity
A third purpose of municipal employee residency laws is to promote
identity with the needs and problems of the city.70 Resident em-
ployees often are presumed to have a greater stake in the city, pro-
viding an incentive for better job performance. 7 Courts generally
have failed to examine critically the validity of such assertions .7  In-
deed, it is difficult to imagine what kind of evidence a municipality
could offer to attest to the psychological identification of resident
and nonresident employees. Many nonresidents will once have lived
in the city, moving from it only after reaching a middle class income.
Family members, former neighbors and friends may still maintain
city domicile. Such ties would provide some incentive for efficient
Shapiro only because suspect classifications and violations of fundamental rights were
involved. Admittedly, the Graham Court was evaluating the public coffer rationale in
light of the suspect classification of alienage (403 U.S. at 372), while the Shapiro Court
subjected the statutes to strict scrutiny because they impinged upon the right to
travel (394 U.S. at 629-31). If strict scrutiny constitutes the basis for the demise of
the public coffer doctrine, the purpose still may retain vitality where courts select a
minimum rationality test for examinations of municipal employee residency require-
ments. But at least one lower court residency requirement opinion has concluded that
the public coffer doctrine has "lost not only [its] compelling nature, but also [its]
constitutionality." Krzewinski v. Kugler, 338 F. Supp. 492, 498 (D.N.J. 1972).
76. Krzewinski v. Kugler, 338 F. Supp. 492, 500 (D.N.J. 1972), provides the major
statement of the "community identity" rationale. See also the following mildly xeno-
phobic editorial printed in the New York Times during debate over the old Lyons
residency law (see note 11 supra):
Offhand, a New York school teacher living in Mount Vernon travels only thirty
miles a day to Grand Central Terminal. But in the course of a year she travels
almost as far as Japan, and how would we like foreigners like the Japanese to
come and take charge of our New York school children.
N.Y. Times, June 1, 1937, at 22, col. 4.
77. See, e.g., Kennedy v. City of Newark, 29 N.J. 178, 184, 148 A.2d 473, 476 (1959).
More recently, Mayor Beame, in pressing for a residency law for New York City workers,
contended that resident employees "will have a much greater vested interest in the
city's well-being and consequently will perform their duties with greater urgency and
zeal," quoted in N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1974, at 37, col. 7.
78. See, e.g., Ector v. City of Torrance, 10 Cal. 3d 129, 135, 514 P.2d 433, 436, 109
Cal. Rptr. 849, 852 (1973) and Abrahams v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 65 N.J. 61, 72-73, 319
A.2d 483, 489 (1974), in which the courts made no effort to examine empirical support
for the "stake" theory.
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performance by municipal employees. Moreover, the job productivity
of employees, which psychological stake is supposed to foster, can be
ascertained directly by effective supervision and work evaluation, thus
allowing its use in promotion and retention of personnel.
Another theory is that residents know more about the city and
and thus are better able to serve it.7 Yet current residents who move
from the city may be as informed about the city as those who main-
tain city residence. A more effective means of ensuring adequate
knowledge about the municipal unit would be to test such knowledge
in appointment examinations. Subsequent education and orientation
sessions could supplement employees' knowledge of city problems. It
is doubtful whether the residency requirement significantly enhances
the acquaintance of city personnel with the problems germane to
their jobs.
Some cities view residency restrictions as a way of strengthening
rapport between municipal workers and city dwellers, particularly
minority groups, so as to lessen misunderstanding and intolerance.80
The nonresident is presumed to be less sensitive to or willing to
respond to the needs of the city and its inhabitants.8' It is assumed
that city residents are more distrustful of police or city workers who
live outside the municipality.
Yet it is questionable whether residency restrictions significantly
increase cooperation. Though employees who migrate to the suburbs
have little contact with ghetto areas, resident municipal workers with
moderate incomes8 2 also are unlikely to live in the inner cities. Mu-
nicipal employees often move to middle class neighborhoods of the
city which are similar to suburban settings. Such resident employees
may spend little off-duty time outside their own area of the city. 3
79. See, e.g., Ector v. City of Torrance, 10 Cal. 3d 129, 135, 514 P.2d 433, 436, 109
Cal. Rptr. 849, 852 (1973); Abrahams v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 65 N.J. 61, 72-73, 319 A.2d
483, 489 (1974).
80. See Krzewinski v. Kugler, 338 F. Supp. 492, 499 (D.N.J. 1972); Detroit Police
Officers Ass'n v. City of Detroit, 385 Mich. 519, 524, 190 N.W.2d 97, 98 (1971) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
81. The Krzewinski court accepted as compelling the state's interest in avoiding spatial
"disengagement between work hours and personal life [which] could detrimentally affect
the [municipal employee's] attitude toward the community and the people he serves."
Krzewinski v. Kugler, 338 F. Supp. 492, 499 (D.N.J. 1972).
82. For policemen with three years on the force, the mean salary in the 20 largest
cities is $11,561; for firemen, $11,399; and for sanitation workers, $8,137. INTERNATIONAL
CITY MANAGEEIFNT ASS'N, THE MUNICIPAL YEAR BOOK 168, 171, 174 (1974). For the base
salaries of these employees in individual cities, see id. at 175-77.
83. It has been argued that residency requirements enhance law enforcement by
ensuring the presence of off-duty policemen within the city. See Krzewinski v. Kugler,
338 F. Supp. 492, 500 (D.N.J. 1972); Detroit Police Officers' Ass'n v. City of Detroit,
385 Mich. 519, 522-23, 190 N.W.2d 97, 98 (1971). Nevertheless, even nonresident police
officers are present within the city during some off-hours, albeit to a lesser degree
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Nor is the distinction between nonresident and resident city workers
necessarily important to inhabitants of ghetto areas. Both classes of
employees may seem to be relative outsiders who execute the di-
rectives of the municipal powers.
There are more direct means, other than residency laws, to attain
the laudable objectives of cooperation and trust between city workers
and city inhabitants. Some programs have encouraged interaction be-
tween municipal employees and local residents.8 4 Many cities have
attempted to hire more workers from minority groups.8 5 Such pro-
grams would seem to bear a more realistic possibility of enhancing
cooperation between city workers and the citizens whom they serve.
IV. An Analogous Substantial Relation Challenge:
Sugarman v. Dougall
The landmark decision of Sugarman v. Dougall"6 involved a statute
which required United States citizenship as a condition of municipal
employment.8s In attempting to uphold the citizenship restriction,
than residents. Nonresidents who commute to homes outside the city can perform law
enforcement functions during commutation. In addition, nonresident police officers
may frequent local establishments, such as bars and retail stores after work hours, thus
adding to off-duty police presence.
84. The New York City police department, for example, initiated a "Cop of the
Block" program in 1971 to encourage informal contact between police and local resi-
dents in the Bedford-Stuyvesant area of Brooklyn. Under the program, policemen visit
local homes and businesses while on duty to become acquainted with area residents.
See N.Y. Times, Jan. 29, 1975, at 37, col. 1. See also TIIE, Apr. 21, 1975, at 33, col. 3
(describing similar program sponsored by the Riverside, Cal. police dep't).
85. Some cities have suggested that residency requirements result in reduction of
the high unemployment rates of inner city minority groups. Two courts have accepted
this rationale without engaging in any analysis of its validity. Ector v. City of Torrance,
10 Cal. 3d 129, 135, 514 P.2d 433, 436, 109 Cal. Rptr. 849, 852 (1973); Abrahams v. Civil
Serv. Comm'n, 65 N.J. 61, 72, 319 A.2d 483, 489 (1974). There is, of course, no necessary
correlation between residency restrictions and the appointment of employees from
minority groups. Any increase in minority representation depends upon the hiring
policies of the city. See Abrahams v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 65 N.J. 61, 88, 319 A.2d 483,
497 (1974) (Pashman, J., dissenting). Pittsburgh, for example, which long has had a resi-
dency law, has experienced over the last seven years a decline in the proportion of black
policemen on its force. Detroit has recorded substantial gains, attributed most plausibly
not to its residency requirement but to hiring procedures which require that blacks
constitute one-half of each new police academy class. N.Y. Times, Aug. 11, 1974, at 1,
col. 6, at 35, col. 1.
86. 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
87. The citizenship requirement invalidated in Sugarman, N.Y. CIVIL SERV. LAw
§ 53(1) (McKinney 1973), barred noncitizens of the United States from appointment
as municipal employees, just as the residency requirements prohibit nonresidents from
holding public jobs. From the viewpoint of the city or state, both noncitizen and non-
resident are "outsiders." Because of his status as an outsider the attempt is made to
exclude the nonresident from public jobs, though this is not to suggest that non-
residents constitute a suspect class.
The language of the New York State citizenship statute was strikingly similar to that of
many residency requirements. Compare N.Y. CIVIL SERV. LAW § 53(1) (McKinney 1973)
with CHICAGO, ILL., CODE § 25-30 (1939) and PITTSBURGH, PA., CHARTER ORDINANCE 450,
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New York State offered purposes largely identical to those offered to
sustain municipal employee residency laws. In striking down the citi-
zenship requirement, the Sugarman Court may have invoked the sub-
stantial relation test. The considerations applied in Sugarman thus
may be relevant to judicial review of municipal residency restrictions.
While some commentators view Sugarman as a strict scrutiny alien-
age case,80 it is possible to view the decision as an example of sub-
stantial relation equal protection analysis. Significantly, the Court
avoided the use of the term "suspect classification," referring to the
concept only obliquely with its citation of Graham v. Richardson.89
The absence of the term is particularly puzzling in that the Supreme
Court decided on the same day another alienage case, In re Griffiths,"
in which the Court repeatedly called alienage a suspect classification,0 '
using it to trigger the strict scrutiny standard of statutory review.
Arguably, the Court in Sugarman ignored the term "suspect classifi-
cation" because it was not at the analytical core of the opinion.
92
The Sugarman opinion does seem to follow the substantial relation
test. The Court recognizes, for example, the state's interest in limiting
participation in government to members of the political community, 93
but holds that "a flat ban on the employment of aliens in positions
that have little, if any, relation to a State's legitimate interest, cannot
§ 42 (1902). The citizenship statute also allowed waivers, as do many residency laws,
should a shortage of "qualified personnel" arise. Compare N.Y. CIVIL SERv. LAW , 53(2)
(McKinney 1973) with CINCINNATI, OHIO, CODE art. XVII, § l(c) (1967). See also Krzewinski
v. Kugler, 338 F. Supp. 492, 503 (D.N.J. 1972) (waiver of residency requirements is valid
if a shortage of qualitied personnel arises).
The analogy between citizenship and residency requirements for municipal employees
was recognized in Hanson v. Unified School Dist., 364 F. Supp. 330, 332 (D. Kan. 1973)
("this kind of [residency] classification bears a resemblance to . . . citizenship require-
ments discussed in Sugarman..."). However, other post-Sugarman residency rcquire-
ment cases do not allude to Sugarman.
88. See, e.g., Das, Discrimination in Employment Against Aliens-The Impact of the
Constitution and Federal Civil Rights Laws, 35 U. PITY. L. REv. 499 (1974).
89. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971), cited in Sugarman v. Dougall, 413
U.S. 634, 641 (1973). Graham held that classifications based on alienage were subject
to strict judicial scrutiny because alienage was a "suspect classification."
90. 413 U.S. 717 (1973).
91. Id. at 721, 725.
92. One commentator suggests that the majority in Sugarman may have avoided the
words "suspect classification" merely to persuade Chief Justice Burger to join their
ranks. Das, supra note 88, at 504 n.38. This suggestion, though somewhat appealing,
perhaps is too facile. Chief Justice Burger, dissenting in Griffiths, seemed to have
reservations about the type of analysis, as well as terminology, involved in use of strict
scrutiny because of a suspect class:
In recent years the Court, in a rather casual way, has articulated the code phrase
"suspect classification" as though it embraced a reasoned constitutional concept.
Admittedly, it simplifies judicial work as do "per se" rules, but it tends to stop
analysis while appearing to suggest an analytical process.
In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 730 (1973) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
93. 413 U.S. at 642, quoting Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 344 (1972).
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withstand scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment."94 Sugarman
embarks on a full analysis of the efficacy of the means taken to ef-
fectuate the state legislative aims.95
The justifications offered in Sugarman to sustain the citizenship
requirement are similar to the rationales offered in employee residency
litigation. The state first argued that aliens, subject to sudden de-
portation or to conscription by their own countries, were less likely
to remain as permanent employees.90 This assumption roughly paral-
lels the emergency duty rationale for residency restrictions, which has
the unexamined presumption that nonresidents are less likely to be
available for work when urgently needed. Courts considering mu-
nicipal employee residency laws should find instructive the response
of the Sugarman Court to the availability argument. The Supreme
Court noted: " 'There is no offer of proof on this issue and [the state]
would be hard pressed to demonstrate that a permanent resident alien
... would be a [poor] risk for a career position. . .. ' "-97 Sugarman
called for more than hypothetical facts, and courts considering residen-
cy restrictions for municipal employees likewise should demand proof
that residency laws actually further legitimate purposes.
Confronted next by the public coffer doctrine, the Sugarman Court
rejected it as inapposite. 98 The case is an explicit abandonment of
the early Supreme Court decisions9 which developed the public cof-
fer rationale in the context of public employment. Sugarman questions
whether the citizenship requirement furthered public coffer objec-
tives since aliens, like citizens, pay taxes.' 00 Just as Sugarman categor-
ically rejected the applicability of the public coffer doctrine in citizen-
ship cases, so should the courts in residency litigation.
The final rationale offered by the state in Sugarman was that of
"identity," in this case political identity. New York State argued that
94. 413 U.S. at 647 (emphasis added).
95. Id. This reading of Sugarman as reflective of the substantial relation standard of
review is consistent with the Court's apparent preference to avoid invocation of the
strict scrutiny test if at all possible. See Gunther, supra note 55, at 17-20; Note, The
Irebuttable Presumption Doctrine, supra note 56, at 1535 n.9; notes 56, 58 supra.
96. 413 U.S. at 645.
97. Id., citing Dougall v. Sugarman, 339 F. Supp. 906, 909 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
98. Following the Graham and Shapiro holdings, the Court held that the public
coffer doctrine had "no applicability in this case." 413 U.S. at 645.
99. People v. Crane, 239 U.S. 195, affirming 214 N.Y. 154, 108 N.E. 427 (1915); Heim
v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175 (1915). In Heim and Crane, the Court upheld state statutes
prohibiting the employment of aliens on public works. In a classic formulation of the
public coffer theory, Justice Cardozo, then a judge of the New York Court of Appeals,
declared: "The state in determining what use [sic] of its own moneys may legitimately
con sult the welfare of its own citizens rather than that of aliens." 214 N.Y. 154, 164, 108
N.E. 427, 430 (1915).
100. 413 U.S. at 645.
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civil servants participate in the formulation of governmental policy
and so must be free of competing obligations to a foreign power.' 0 '
Implicit is the familiar assumption that outsiders lack sufficient stake
in and undivided commitment to a municipal entity. The Court ac-
cepted the "require[ment of] citizenship as a qualification for of-
fice"'1 2 but rendered the statute void as applied to municipal employ-
ees. Sugarman thus indicates that residency restrictions might be
valid for local officers.' 03 But in light of Sugarman, the political
identity rationale cannot justify residency restrictions for employees,
whether clerical personnel, sanitation workers, police or firemen.
In short, the municipal employee citizenship requirement at issue
in Sugarman fell because of the insubstantial and conjectural ration-
ales advanced for it. There was little evidence that the law substan-
tially furthered the statutory objectives. Such infirmities pervade the
purposes of residency requirements for municipal employees as well.
Sugarman thus may serve as an analogy for litigation involving a
related class of outsiders-the nonresident.
Conclusion
Municipal employee residency requirements are imposed by cities
throughout the United States. The restrictions arguably violate the
fundamental interest of municipal employees in freedom to travel,
specifically, in freedom to migrate and settle outside city limits. Yet
the designation of the right to travel as a fundamental interest in
such a setting raises unsettled doctrinal questions concerning "intra-
state" travel and postappointment durational requirements. Because
of these uncertainties, the Court may prefer to use the substantial
relation equal protection test. By this test, the classification of resi-
dents and nonresidents and discrimination between them in municipal
employment must substantially advance the purposes offered in sup-
port. As this Note suggests, there is serious question whether the
residency requirements in fact substantially further their putative
purposes. Residency restrictions thus often may be invalid as a denial
of equal protection.
101. Id. at 641.
102. Id. at 647 (emphasis added).
103. See note 2 supra.
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